University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Economics ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

9-10-2010

Adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the
United States: Which Factors Matter?
Angely Andrea Cárcamo Gallardo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/econ_etds
Recommended Citation
Cárcamo Gallardo, Angely Andrea. "Adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States: Which Factors Matter?." (2010).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/econ_etds/42

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

Adoption of Renewable Portfolio
Standards in the United States:
Which Factors Matter?

by
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Abstract
The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) has become the most important instrument in United States to encourage the generation of electricity through the use of
renewable energy. In brief, the RPS is a policy mechanism that requires suppliers of
electricity to provide a specific percentage of their energy supply from some form of
renewable energy. Such a percentage is referred to as the RPS ultimate target. In
this thesis factors affecting the adoption of an RPS by U.S. states are investigated.
Through statistical regression, this thesis specifically studies the effects of political
views, energy endowments, electricity markets, economic factors, and other variables.
These factors are related to pollution levels and geographical location in the adoption
of an RPS and its ultimate target. Raw data from several federal agencies, national

vii

laboratories, and the U.S Census Bureau were collected and used in the analysis.
Independent variables are related to energy generation, geographical location in the
electricity generation grid, political tendency, economic indicators, electricity market,
and pollution. The dependent variable represents the adoption or not of the RPS
and its ultimate target. Since only a fraction of the states have adopted an RPS
policy and defined a target, data associated with the RPS exhibits what is termed as
a corner solution response, meaning that data is continuous and non-negative over
strictly positive values, but takes the value zero for some non-trivial fraction of the
population. Thus, a Tobit model was used for the analysis. Results indicate that
the Tobit model yields a valid representation of the data. For comparison, a model
based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) has also been estimated and its results are
in agreement with those obtained for the Tobit model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Introduction

In the 1970’s, the stability of the U.S. energy supply became a national security
concern because of the dependence on foreign sources of energy, especially oil. Since
then, the dependence has increased. In 2007, the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimated that approximately 58% of all the oil used in the U.S. is imported1 .
One of the world’s most challenging problems is global warming. The major
cause of this problem is emissions of green house gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide
(CO2 ), nitrogen dioxide (N O2 ), sulphur dioxide (SO2 ) into the atmosphere. These
gases are mainly produced as a waste product when combusting fossil fuels. The
generating sector of the power system is one of the major consumer of fossil fuels
such as coal, oil, or gas and responsible for the 40.6 percent of all energy-related CO2
emissions2 .
1

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy in brief/foreign oil dependence.cfm (last acceseed
02/05/2009)
2 ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057308.pdf
(last
accessed
01/20/2009)
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For both national security reasons and environmental concerns there is a movement towards generating a large portion of the electricity using renewable energy
resources. Renewable resources are typically secure domestic resources and free of
the most harmful GHG emissions.
Increased future demand for energy as a consequence of both economic and population growth, coupled with concerns about national security and the environment,
has led to the creation of incentives for the use of renewable energy sources to generate electricity. These incentives include tax incentives, investment tax credits,
Production Tax Credit (PTC), and regulatory mechanisms such as technology specification standards, target-based standards, and market facilitation or limitation policies.
Since the 1970’s, concerns regarding the use of fossil fuels in energy production
have increased, resulting in an interest in policies that can increase the amount of
renewable energy sources in electricity generation.
The most popular policy tool to encourage the use of renewables in the electricity generation industry is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)3 . In brief, the
RPS is a policy mechanism that requires suppliers of electricity to provide a specific
percentage of their energy supply from some form of renewable energy. Some of the
RPS policies also permit the trading of Renewable Energy Certificates (REC). Since
the first state enacted an RPS4 , the policy has become the most utilized policy to
incentivize the use of renewables in electricity generation.
The government of President Barack Obama currently has plans to promote a
healthy environment and energy independence in order to decrease the risk to national security and the economy. One of President Obama’s proposals is to adopt
3 The

RPS is also termed as the Renewable Energy Standard, the Quota System, and
the Renewable Obligation.
4 Iowa in 1983
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the RPS as a Federal policy (Obama). However, a Federal RPS would likely affect
some states negatively, which may explain why some states have chosen not to adopt
an RPS policy. States need to incentivize the use of renewables in the generation of
electricity. RPS is one instrument to do so, with advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages to a States from adopting and RPS include:
• a state can know and be ensured of the quantity of renewable energy being
generated in the state,
• a state can lower the cost for achieving the RPS ultimate target by giving
private market flexibility,
• an RPS is competitively neutral if it is applied to all load-serving entities,
• RPS has relatively low administrative costs and burdens, and can be applied
in restructured and regulated markets.
Some disadvantages of an RPS are that:
• it is difficult to create a well designed RPS due to the complexity of the electricity market,
• it is less flexible than some other policy instruments that incentivize the use of
renewables in electricity generation, in how it offers targeted support to some
specific renewable energy sources or in how it is ensuring resource diversity,
• the cost impacts are not very well known in advance, and as a result states
may have reduced control of the electricity price
• due to the fact that the operating experience emerging is new, there are many
questions as to whether RPS policies will necessarily lead to long-term contracts.

3
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A challenge for states willing to implement an RPS is rising electricity prices;
therefore, most states allow the electricity supplier to comply with RPS goals by
buying RECs. However, by using RECs, the emissions from electricity generation
will not be reduced, causing localized pollution problems which, in turn, carry consequences for the environment.
A Federal RPS was proposed in 2002 and 2005 in both the House of Representatives and the Senate but was not approved. Separate Federal RPSs have been independently proposed by Senator Jeffords (a Republican senator of Vermont), Senator
Bingaman (a Democratic senator of New Mexico), and Senator Coleman (a Republican senator of Minnesota). These Federal RPS proposals have some features in
common: a renewable production target and schedule, a defined range of qualifying technology, tradable credits, and credit price caps with an exception for certain
classes of retail electricity suppliers (Wiser et al., 2007).
However, there are also differences between the proposals. For example, in Coleman’s proposal the qualifying technologies include nuclear power and fossil-fired
plants that are required to capture and sequester carbon dioxide emissions. In the
Bingaman proposal, which was passed to the Senate in 2002, and in a similar proposal
in 2005, the existing hydropower would not count toward the clean energy requirement, but would reduce the retail supplier’s renewable energy purchase obligation
(Wiser et al., 2007).
All of the proposed Federal RPS policies include one important element in the
RPS’s design, namely, an accommodation of the pre-existing state’s RPS policies.
Bingaman’s proposal specified that a “Federal RPS would not pre-empt state programs, and should coordinate to the extent practicable with such programs” (Wiser
et al., 2007, pp. 18). However, this proposal did not address the decision of whether
a certain type of generation complies with the federal target requirement or the
financial compliance mechanisms, and penalties.

4
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The main goal of this thesis is to determine and analyze the importance of all
those variables, including technical, economic and political factors, that affect the
likelihood of states adopting an RPS policy.
An important adverse factor for the states to consider is that adoption of an RPS
policy by a state is associated with an incremental increase in the price of a kilowatt
hour (KWh) (Chen et al., 2008). Due to the cost associated with investing in new
technologies to generate electricity using renewables, the increment in the price plays
as an important constraint for adopting the policy (Chen et al., 2008).

1.2

Background

During the latter part of the 19th century, starting with the creation of the light bulb
in 1878 in Paris, electricity consumption grew very fast. The first public generation
of energy was in Australia in 1895. In the early days of the Electricity Supply
Industry (ESI) suppliers were public companies because the electricity was considered
as a basic utility. For developing countries access to electrical power became a
development indicator. As a consequence, developing countries, with the objective
of expanding the electricity service to all customers and standardizing public services,
started to nationalize their energy sectors in the 1940’s.

5
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Include three operating entities that operate the Federal Hydroelectric

Federal Electric Utility

resale at cost.
Table 1.1 – Continued on the next page

wholesale market to publicly owned utilities and rural cooperatives for

consumers or Federal Installations. Remaining energy is sold in the

State). The Federal Utilities Consumers are usually large industrial

and the International Water and Boundary Commission (Department of

Defense), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Department of the Interior),

plants. The entities are U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Department of

Competitive entities

Any supplier

systems.

Generate power but do not own or operate transmission or distribution

The electric utilities are regulated by state and Federal agencies.

Electric Service Provider (ESP)

Load-Serving Entity (LSE)

Nonutilities

Either privately owned companies or public agencies engaged in the

Electric Utility

generation, transmission and/or distribution of electric power use.

Definition

Term

an RPS Policy

Table 1.1: Types of Electricity Suppliers Considered in
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Definition

7

Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU)

Rural Electric Utilities

including other IOU public utility districts and rural electric cooperatives.

different types of consumers and at wholesale rates to other utilities

companies that are integrated with each other. IOUs sell power to

a parent company is established to own one or more operating utility

Private and public supplier in the form of a holding company, in which

(iii) generation and transmission.

(i) distribution only, (ii) distribution with power supply, and

power to those areas. There are three types of cooperatives:

Are formed and owned by groups of residents in rural areas to supply

state organizations.

state authorities, public power districts, irrigation districts, and other

electricity to their consumers. POUs include municipal authorities,

exclusively on power purchases. Their primary function is to distribute

supplement their production by purchasing power. Non-generators rely

supply some or all of their customers needs. However, some generators

electric utilities that own and operate sufficient generating capacity to

Publicly Owned Utilities (POU) Are categorized as generators and non-generators. Generators are those

Term

Table 1.1 – Continued from the previous page
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given preference in purchasing from them.
* Are primarily producers and wholesalers.
* Producing agencies for some are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and the International Water and Boundary

utilities in the U.S. and they

operate in all regions except the

Northeast, upper Midwest, and

Hawaii.

Table 1.2 – Continued on the next page

* Publicly owned utilities, cooperatives, and other nonprofits entities are

There are nine Federally owned

Commission.

* Power is not generated for profit.

* Are regulated by State and Federal governments, which in turn approve

they operate in all States except

Federally Owned Utility:

* Have an obligation to serve and to provide reliable electric power.

There are 239 IOUs in the U.S., and

generation, transmission, and distribution.

* Are granted service monopolies in specified geographic areas.

utility generation and capacity.

privately owned utilities.

stockholders as dividends or reinvest the profits.

IOUs account for 75 percent of all

rates that allow operating companies to provide basic services for

* Earn a return for investors; either distribute their profits to

Investor-Owner Utility (IOU):

Nebraska. They also referred to as

Major characteristics

Ownership

by Type of Ownership, 1998

Table 1.2: Major Characteristics of U.S. Electric Utilities
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in AZ, voters for the Board of Directors are apportioned according to

in the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District

* Irrigation districts may have still other forms of organization (e.g.

municipal government.

commissioners or directors to govern the district independent of any

WA, OR, AZ, and CA; voters in a public power district elect

* Public power districts and projects are concentrated in five states, NE,

treasuries and revenue bonds.

* Most municipalities just distribute power, although some large ones

State Authorities, Irrigation Districts,

There are 2,009 in the U.S.

community contributions and reduced taxes.

Municipally, Public Power Districts,

produce and transmit electricity; they are financed from municipal

* Service at cost; return excess funds to the consumers in the form of

Other publicly owned utilities include

and other state organizations.

* Are nonprofit state and local government agencies.

this category and markets at both wholesale and retail levels.

* The Tennessee Valley Authority is the largest producer of electricity in

marketing administrations in the U.S. DOE.

* Electricity generated by these agencies is marketed by federal power

Major characteristics

Other Publicly Owned Utilities:

Ownership

Table 1.2 – Continued from the previous page
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* Provide service mostly to members.
* Incorporated under State law and directed by an elected board of
directors which, in turn, selects a manager.
* The Rural Utilities Service (formerly the Rural Electrification
Administration) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture was established
under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 with the purpose of extending

There are 912 cooperatively owned

utilities in the U.S., and they

operate in all States except

Connecticut, Hawaii,

Rhode Island, and

the District of Columbia.

* Buy and sell electricity.
* Do not own or operate generation, transmission, or distribution facilities.

There are 194 active power marketers

in the U.S.

Source: The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update, October 2000, (EIA, 2000).

* Some are utility-affiliated while others are independent.

Power Market:

expensive to provide service.

(usually fewer than 1,500 consumers) and farms where it was relatively

credits to co-ops to provide electric service to small rural communities

* Owned by members (rural farmers and communities)

Service Authority, are agents of their respective state governments.

* State authorities, such as the NY Power Authority and the SC Public

the size of landholdings.)

Major characteristics

Cooperatively Owned Utilities:

Ownership

Table 1.2 – Continued from the previous page
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The organizational development of the ESI has been changing according to the
technological capabilities, the sources of funding, and legislation related to organizational development. For the U.S., the development of the ESI has followed the same
trends as the rest of the world. In the U.S., in the 1930’s, the ESI was mainly composed of Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) and the Public Utility Commission (PUC),
both of which had a high degree of control regulating the utilities and their prices.
However, by the 1930’s three utilities controlled more than fifty percent of the generation of electricity in the U.S., and cost control was difficult to regulate, (Harris,
2006). In 1935, the states took control of the market power with two Acts, the Public
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act. The PUHCA
forced large utilities to break into vertically integrated utilities, and the Federal Power
Commission5 was given the authority to grant licenses for generation and transmission, giving control to the companies and assuring fair and non-discriminatory access
(Harris, 2006).

In addition, regional cooperation between energy transmission areas started in
1927 with three utilities, creating the first power pool. In 1957 those utilities became
the Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland Interconnection (PJM) with the joining of
two other utilities. The lack of self regulation of the electricity market produced an
increased need for technical management. This insufficiency in regulation triggered
the creation of the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) in the
late 1960’s. The NERC is the entity in charge of ensuring the reliability in the bulk
power system in United States (U.S.).

5 The

Federal Electricity Commission in 1978
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1.2.1

Electricity Market and Deregulation

In the 1970’s, after the first oil shock, the stability of the U.S. energy supply became
a national security concern because of the dependence on foreign sources of energy,
especially oil. In 1973, President Nixon “launched Project Independence with a legal
deterrent to generation from imported fossil fuel in the form of oil and natural gas”
(Harris, 2006, pp. 18). This project was the starting point for a series of policies
and mechanisms looking for new sources of energy, with the main goal was to make
the U.S. independent of foreign sources of energy.
In 1978, under President Carter’s administration, the Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act (PURPA) was passed. PURPA forced participants in the electricity market to accept power generation from qualifying facilities in order to reduce costs.
Specifically, the PURPA required utilities to purchase renewables and others independent electricity at prices that reflected the long run cost of new, high-cost nuclear
and fossil fuel plants (Jaccard, 2004). Before PURPA, only utilities could own and
operate electric generating plants. PURPA required utilities to buy power from independent companies that could produce power with lower costs than those incurred
by the power utility generation; this was termed as the “avoided cost.”
In the U.S. in the 1980’s, the organizational development objective was to reduce
the costs to customers and increase innovation through competition. Currently,
the ESI companies are primarily influenced by their ownership and finance. There
are five different categories of electricity suppliers classified by ownership: investor
owned corporation, public sector (towns, municipalities, public corporation, federal
agencies), cooperatives (in practice a very small percentage), individual or privately
owned companies (Harris, 2006). Table 1.1 summarizes some of the terminology
used in the explanation of the RPS. In addition, Table 1.2 explains the major
characteristics of U.S. electric utilities by type of ownership (EIA, 2000).

12
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In 1992, the Energy Policy Act allowed independent generators to sell their power
directly to the local distribution network and supply companies, even if this meant
selling the power to other power generators. Also, the Energy Policy Act gave the
right to provide transportation without discrimination. It must be commented that
at the beginning of the ESI, generators owned the transmission lines. They had
the right to allow or deny access to their transmission lines for other generators
not following the regulation for selling the energy produced. Since 1996 with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders 888 and 889 transmission6
was defined in a wide sense: making the transmission lines available to be accessed
by any supplier, specifying a safety factor for the maximum load in the transmission
lines, and establishing that generators must balance the supply of energy among
their customers.
In summary, it can be seen that the variety of the structural forms of ownership
operation and control of the power grid in the U.S. is the consequence of the technical,
physical and socioeconomic complexity of the industry.
Since 1978, the U.S. Government has created incentives for the use of renewable
energy sources to generate electricity. These incentives include tax incentives, investment tax credits, Production Tax Credits PTC, and regulatory mechanisms such as
technology specification standards, target-based standards and market facilitation or
limitation policies (Kreith and Goswami, 2007). One of these incentive mechanism
is the RPS. To date, the RPS is the most exercised industry-incentive mechanism
for the use of renewable energy in electricity generation in the U.S. Since the 1990s,
the RPS has been adopted by 25 states and the District of Columbia. Half of the 26
programs in existence at the end of 2007 were created in 2004 (Wiser and Barbose,
2008).

6 http://www.ferc.gov/legal/majordreg/landdocs/rm95900k.txt

05/15/2010)
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Chapter 2
Renewable Portfolio Standard
Policies

2.1

Policy Description

Since the late 1990s, RPS policies have been implemented increasingly across states
and have emerged as an important driver for renewable energy capacity additions
in the U.S. (Wiser et al., 2007). Initially, the RPS was proposed as a mechanism
to support renewable energy development in competitively restructured electricity
markets. Now, the RPS has become a policy that encourages fuel diversity in the
electricity market (Cory and Swezey, 2007).
The RPS policies are designed to maintain, increase, or significantly increase the
use of renewable energy in the electricity supply. An RPS establishes a specific quantity or percentage as a renewable energy supply target for retail electricity suppliers1 .
In addition, RPS policies intend to encourage competition between renewable developers to reach the target level at the minimum possible cost.
1

This target is also known as “renewables obligation” or “quota system.”
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The RPS has two major definitions2 :
Definition 1. The Renewable Use Portfolio Standard is an approach that requires
the use of renewable energy. The electricity supplier can choose to generate its
own renewable energy or purchase it from other electricity suppliers.
Definition 2. The Renewable Production Portfolio Standard is an approach that
forces the electricity supplier to produce a specific amount of its electricity
using renewable resources. This approach does not allow the suppliers to buy
credits or seek out other less expensive alternatives to achieve the policy goals
(Wiser et al., 2005).
The definition of RPS used in the U.S. is a mix between definition 1 and 2. A
mechanism with the objective of increasing the supply of electricity generated using
renewable energy. Such an objective is achieved by either requiring or forcing electricity suppliers to generate or purchase renewable energy from other suppliers.
In the U.S., an RPS policy is fundamental for the future of the electricity market
because it encourages investment in renewable energy generation capacity and is
used as a mechanism to decrease emissions produced from electricity generation.
Renewable sources for RPS are sunlight, heat, geothermal, wind, wave power, tidal
energy, organic matters, and small hydropower (less than 20 MW) (Rabe, 2006;
Wiser and Barbose, 2008).
The design of RPS policies vary across states, however, the definition has a common objective: it requires a Load-Serving Entity (LSE) to comply with a specific
minimum quantity of suitable renewable energy (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). As a
part of its design, an RPS policy defines a numeric target for renewable energy supply; that is, it requires electricity suppliers or LSEs to include a specific amount or
2 In

the U.S. there is no difference between Definition 1 and 2 because compliance mechanisms differ across the states.
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percentage of renewable energy as part of their supply portfolio, thereby increasing the production of electricity from renewable energy sources and simultaneously,
encouraging competition among renewable development to reach new targets in a
least-cost fashion (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). The RPS establishes specific numeric
targets, which are designed to increase over time. This is done to further encourage
competition among electricity suppliers, and to create and give incentives to industry
to accelerate the development of new renewable technologies at reduced production
costs.
The RPS is a market friendly incentive to achieve the minimum amount of clean
energy required by each state’s government. The RPS has become the most used policy renewable incentive to increase energy production because it does not necessarily
require an explicit allocation of governmental funding.
Under the RPS policy regime, electricity suppliers have three ways to achieve the
goal or percentage of supplied electricity produced using renewable energy by:
1. producing more renewable energy itself
2. purchasing renewable energy produced by other supplier
3. buying Renewable Energy Certificates (REC)3 .
Different ways to comply with the policy across states is one of the major problems
for the adoption of a national RPS proposal.
The RPS requirements that apply to retail electricity suppliers have some flexibility in the way the company can acquire the renewable generation. RECs are
3 RECs

are also termed Renewable Energy Certificate, Tradable Renewable Certificates
(TRC), Renewables Energy Attributes, or Green Tag. REC corresponds to the attributes
of one megawatt-hour megawatts hour (MWh) generated using renewable energy. RECs
are a financial product, market instrument or tradable commodity separated from the
physical electricity generated created “by separating the attributes of renewable electricity
generation from physical electricity produced” (Cory and Swezey, 2007, pp. 22).
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useful to retail suppliers because they have the option of demonstrating compliance
with the RPS by buying RECs, in lieu of directly producing “watts of renewable
electricity.” Thus, RECs play an important role in helping the utilities comply with
the policy target when the policy allows the companies to trade them. Across the
U.S. many RPS policies use tradable RECs to increase flexibility, to reduce the cost
of compliance, and to track compliance more easily. REC trading, banking, and
borrowing are allowed in most states. RECs are usually purchased using long-term
and short-term contracts or spot purchases. In addition, the renewable generators
have another revenue stream with REC transactions.
The RPS design characteristics also vary across the states in design, target selection, incentives to develop expensive technologies such solar and photovoltaic, social
benefits, etc. However, for the purpose of this thesis, an RPS with a policy requiring electricity generators to supply a specific quantity of renewable energy has been
assumed. The theory and conceptual design of RPS sounds simple and straightforward; however, in practice its design and implementation vary in important ways
from one state to another making analysis challenging. The major types of policy variation were categorized by the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory (LBNL), and can be seen in Table 2.1 (Wiser et al., 2005).
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- Enforcement mechanisms (penalties)
- Existence of cost caps and
alternative compliance payments
- Compliance flexibility mechanisms
(banking, borrowing, etc)
- Contracting standards for regulated
Retails suppliers, LSEs
- Cost recovery for regulated retail
suppliers
- Interactions with other energy
and environmental policies

- Regulatory oversight body(ies)
- Verify compliance-RECs
or contracts-path
- Certification of
eligible generators
- Compliance filing requirements

- Geographic eligibility
- Resource eligibility
- Eligibility of existing
renewable generation
- Definition of new incremental
generation
- Treatment of multi-fuel facilities
- Treatment of off-grid and
customers-sited facilities

Administration

Eligibility

Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

- Application to retail suppliers,
and exemptions from obligation
- Product or company-based application

- Resource diversity requirements
or incentives
- Start date
- Duration of obligation (sunset provisions)

- Structure single tier or multiple tiers

Structure, Size
and Application
- Basics energy vs. capacity obligation
- Purchase obligation over time

Table 2.1: RPS Policy Design Options
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The RPS design varies across the U.S., Table 2.1 summarizes the main sources
of variation. The design features can be classified into the following groups: target
selection, eligibility of resources, applicability. flexibility mechanisms, and administrative responsibilities. It must be noted these features are all interconnected. Also,
the RPS group of standard policy objectives plays an important role in the design.
These RPS objectives are the following: effectiveness, equity, political acceptability,
administrative feasibility, and the specific environmental and social motivation for
the RPS (Jaccard, 2004). In particular, the major design features are:

• Target selection4 is the selection of the portion of renewables in the energy
mix in the ultimate target size, target timing, whether there is one or multiple
renewables targets, target adjustment and other cost cap measures.
• Eligibility of resources5 includes renewables versus other desired technologies
(e.g. biodiesel, tidal current, fuel cells using renewables fuels, and digester gas),
existing renewables versus new investments, grid-connected renewables versus
all renewables, facility size, and import versus exports.
• Applicability includes geographic coverage, the types of market participants
regulated by the RPS, and whether energy production or installed capacity is
considered.
• Flexibility mechanisms6 include account-balancing mechanisms for individual
producers, and trading mechanisms between producers.
4 Target

selection may have an impact on costs depending on local costs, availability of
renewables, and the price of conventional electricity.
5 The eligibility of resources depends on the RPS objective and the resource location
viability.
6 The RPS can be less costly to implement depending on how flexible the RPS is when
applied to the producers, individually and across the market.
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• Administrative responsibilities7 include the responsibilities in the implementation such as setting the RPS target, certification of renewables, compliance
monitoring, and setting and collecting penalties for noncompliance.
The success of the design of an RPS policy for a state depends on whether it is
sufficiently balancing conflicting policy goals. There are several policy principles and
best practices which can guide policy makers when they face up policy tradeoffs. The
policy principles used in the design of RPS policies are the following (Wiser et al.,
2005):
• Social benefits: the policy will incentivize an increased renewable energy production, thereby contributing to the environmental quality and increasing the
diversity of energy supply among other political chosen objectives.
• Cost effectiveness and flexibility: both the implementation and the administration have to be straightforward, flexible, cost effective, and not too demanding.
• Predictability: the policy should provide stable market for all the participants,
while reducing regulatory risk and improving the ability to develop long-term
contracts with the consumers.
• Nondiscriminatory: the policy should be applied to all the participants in the
market, that is, all the utilities and all the consumers, if required.
• Enforceability: the policy should have some way to enforce that all market
participants comply with the target and major goals.
• Consistency with market structure: the policy should be designed according to
the type of market present in the state regardless of whether it is regulated
or not. For example, in a competitive market the policy should be applied
7 These

responsibilities in the implementation of RPS can be handled by a single administrator or by specialized agencies.
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to all the participants in order to avoid the creation of an artificial barrier to
competitive entry. In the case of a vertically integrated market, the policy has
to establish clear contracting standards to ensure long-term contracts for the
renewable generators, thereby ensuring prudent compliance practices. Also in
competitive markets the policy has to ensure cost recovery in the electricity
rates.
• Compatibility with other existing policies: the RPS policy must be compatible
with other policies and regulations already adopted by the state or federally.
For example, the policy must be in agreement with the charge system of benefits8 and the tax incentives that are designed to encourage the investment in
renewables. If the RPS is to be applied to a market where emission rights are
present, policy-makers must ensure that these rights stay bundled with RECs
from the RPS.

Due to both inherent differences among states as well as differences in the progress
made in implementation of policies, the RPS has to be analyzed following specific
criteria (Wiser et al., 2005):

• Outcome criteria: refers to the value of the actual impact and results of state
RPS policies such as renewable energy development, economic costs, and other
outcome-based criteria.
• Policy design criteria: covers the legislative and regulatory RPS design features
that may affect on the success of the RPS.
• Market context criteria: takes into consideration that even a well-design RPS
can fail in yielding an effect on the market.
8 small

charge on customers’ electricity rates
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The RPS numeric targets typically increase over time and retail suppliers must
demonstrate compliance with the RPS’s target annually. Often, the suppliers suffer
penalties if they do not achieve compliance.
The most common target policies specify a periodic schedule, typically annual,
that specifies the share amount of electricity sales that must be accounted for in order
to comply with RPS. In certain instances, targets are based on absolute generation
or installed capacity.
Although the term “renewable” is commonly used in the design of the RPS,
there is no official agreement about eligible resources. Typically, when wind, solar, geothermal, landfill–gas, and ocean-based energy resources are available in the
state, these resources are accepted for compliance with the RPS requirement. On the
other hand, biomass, Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) incineration, and hydropower
resources greater than 20 MW are not frequently used to comply with RPS requirement. The inclusion of hydropower as part of the RPS must be submitted for
approval to policy-makers depending on its size, age, or design, such as the run-ofriver and storage projects. Some projects allow other options to comply with the
final target, including allowing non renewable generation or non-generation activities, such as energy efficiency programs that help the retail suppliers to earn credits
towards reaching the target. All the aforementioned options to meet the target may
vary according to the geographic location of the eligible generators and the specific
requirement of generators to locally deliver the electricity.
The RPS policy costs are expected to be recovered by the utilities. Regulated utilities recover their cost-of-service through a standard rate-making proceeding. When
retail competition is allowed, cost recovery is not certain. However, any excess cost
is likely to be passed on to the electricity consumers, and in some states, the government will absorb some of the costs. The government uses cost caps to determine
the cost limits of the RPS compliance. Moreover, several mechanisms to enforce
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Figure 2.1: Definitions of RPS Policy Across the States. (Source: RPS in the United
States: A Status Report with Data Through 2007, Wiser and Barbose, 2008. LBNL.)

the RPS are used, including electricity license revocation and civil fines. Alternative
ways to comply with the RPS without renewable generation are statutory waivers
and discretionary waivers.
RPS policy varies widely from one state to another. For example, an RPS varies
in the target selection and the year of compliance. This can be from 4% in MA for
2009 to 40% in ME in 2017. Also, in AZ, WA, CA, TX, NM, CO, MA, NC it is
mandatory to comply with the target. While in MN it is not. Figure 2.1 shows the
variations in ultimate RPS target.
Moreover, the differences are not only in design. The RPS has been enacted
very differently across the states. For example, in Arizona and New York RPSs were
enacted using the regulatory channel, while in Colorado and Washington they were
enacted through voter-approved initiatives. In some states the target required by
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the RPS is mandatory and in others the target is voluntary 9 . Currently 25 states
and the District of Columbia have adopted the policy with mandatory obligations
in restructured electricity markets and in cost-of-service regulated markets, covering
approximately 40% of the total electrical load.

2.2

Literature Review

By the year 2007, a RPS was effectively implemented in 25 states and the District
of Columbia with targets for the renewable energy requirement, ranging from 2% in
Iowa to 40% in Maine. Other states, such as Illinois, Vermont and Virginia, have
established non-binding renewable energy goals. The RPS has different time horizons
among the states in order to achieve the quota selected. Also, there are differences in
the design, which include technology and geographic eligibility, methods used to reach
the compliance, and specific implementation. These differences create challenges in
forming conclusions about the effect and applicability of the RPS throughout the
entire nation (Cory and Swezey, 2007).
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the LBNL have conducted several studies regarding different aspects of the RPS policy. Some of these
studies evaluate U.S. experiences with RPS, study the RPS goal and implementations strategies applied so far in U.S. (Wiser et al., 2007), (Cory and Swezey, 2007).
Advantages and disadvantages of the RPS performance relative to other renewable
energy policies have also been reported in the literature. Wiser et al. (2004) concluded that the experience from the U.S. has shown that a well-designed and well
implemented RPS policy is effective policy in supporting incremental use of renewable energy (Wiser, 2004). Examples of a well-performing RPS policies are found
in Texas, Iowa, and Minnesota. Texas has been successful in increasing the new
9 The

target quota is voluntary in Iowa, Illinois, Vermont, and Maine.
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renewable load capacity at a reasonable cost (Langniss and Wiser, 2003). Iowa and
Minnesota are currently achieving successful results in their energy requirements,
achieving their goals of renewable energy purchase by the IOU and the larger state
utility, respectively (Wiser, 2004). In other states, the RPS has not been in use for
a sufficient time to evaluate results. From all the experiences in the application of
the RPS, some typical design failures faced by the states can be summarized. These
failures are: “narrow applicability, poorly balanced supply-demand conditions, insufficient duration and stability of targets, insufficient enforcement, and poorly defined
or non-existent contracting standards and cost recovery mechanisms for regulated
utilities and providers of last resort,” (Wiser et al., 2005, pp. 261). In a market
context, criteria of a well-designed RPS policy usually includes “credit-worthy longterm power purchasers, stable political and regulatory support, and adequate and
accessible renewable resource potential,” (Wiser et al., 2005, pp. 261).
In 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) described the most important features of an RPS policy. The work states that these features include applicability to the market participants, resources eligibility, policy administration, cost
caps, and cost recovery. The RPS policy implementation issues can be divided in resource availability, resource-specific provisions, political and regulatory consistency,
and ability to finance new projects (Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).
Renewable resources available in each state vary across the regional climates and
geographies. The renewable energy resources such as biomass, solar, photovoltaic,
wind, geothermal, natural gas, and coal can be seen in the Figures 2.2 to 2.8. The
natural resources distribution is not equitable across the states for example the southwest is rich in solar reserves but it is not in biomass nor wind.
An important RPS objective is to encourage competition between renewable electricity suppliers. Challenges of many renewable energy technologies are costs, measurement and verification issues. A good example is solar energy which has a problem
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Biomass in USA. (Source: NREL)

for compliance the RPS goals due to its output measurement and verification. Some
states to encourage the use of solar energy giving some incentives to its consumers
helping the competition between renewable electricity suppliers.
Political and regulatory consistency are important for market confidence. If these
features are not appropriately established, they can create uncertainty about the
stability and longevity of the law, decreasing investor confidence. Negative factors in
this aspect include compliance waivers, vague eligibility definitions, low costs impact
thresholds, and weak enforcement penalties.
It is important to note that an RPS must create and manage conditions allowing
new electrical projects to be financed and built. The market structure can be regulated with a single supplier or restructured from market competition. In either case,
it is essential to have a creditworthy purchasing entity.
In summary, there are a large and diverse number of issues associated with the
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Solar Resources in USA. (Source: NREL)

design of an RPS across the states. However, it is believed that a federal RPS could

Figure 2.4: Distribution of Photovoltaic Solar Reserves in USA. (Source: NREL)
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Wind in USA. (Source: NREL)

provide a solution to those problems (Sovacool, 2008). A national RPS should be
designed to reduce market distortions, to bring uniformity and predictability into

Figure 2.6: Distribution of Geothermal Resources in USA. (Source: NREL)
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Natural Gas Supply in USA. (Source: NREL)

the renewable energy market, and to promote diversity of the nation’s electricity fuel
mix. Also, “a national RPS would diminish conflict over RPS eligible fuels, reduce
uncertainty over the duration of state RPS policy and eliminate inequities created
by “free rider” states that enjoy artificially low prices while others states pay to
clean up the effects of cheap, dirty fuels” (Cooper, 2008, pp. 10). Moreover, several
authors outside national laboratories have been studying RPS as an instrument to
incentivize the use of renewables in electricity generation in different contexts.

Palmer and Burtraw (2005), found that the increased price in states that adopted
an RPS would result in reduced the natural gas generation rather than reduced coal
production. The authors analyzed the effects of two government policies which are
designed to increase the supply of renewables in U.S., RPS and Renewable Energy
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Coal Reserves in USA. (Source: NREL)

Production Credit (REPC)10 . The authors simulate the effects of both policies in
the electricity market considering the effects of costs, utility investment, technologies
and fuels used to generate electricity. They analyzed the effects on electricity prices
and on carbon emissions from electricity generators. Palmer and Burtraw (2005)
concluded that “RPS is more cost-effective then REPC, both as a means of increasing
renewables and reducing carbon emissions”(Palmer and Burtraw, 2005, pp. 874).
Also they find that the production of natural gas will decrease in states which did
not adopt carbon taxes or cap and trade policies.
Knittel (2006) analyzed the role of interest groups in the adoption of an RPS in
the states. The author models states’ decision to adopt an RPS policy as a hazard
rate. The author concludes that the adoption is positively correlated to the capacity
10 REPC

are tax credits for certain types of renewables.
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of shortages, high level of wealth, and lower residential electricity penetration rates11
(Knittel, 2006).
Huang et al. (2007) investigated the influence of the factors involved in the
decision of adopting an RPS by the states in the U.S. The authors employ economic,
environmental, and political explanatory variables in a cross sectional data analysis.
However, the analysis cannot control for the effect in some explanatory variables
across the time. For example, the author cannot analyze the effect of some variables
such as date of adoption of an RPS or in reductions of pollutants across time. In
this paper, the authors consider socioeconomic, political, and environmental factors
which impact on the adoption of an RPS by a state. Huang et al. conclude that
high educational levels in a state and high gross state products are factors with
a greater effect on the increment in the probability to adopt RPS among other
socioeconomic variables. Huang et al. analyzed the influence of some factors, such
as socioeconomic, political, and environmental, on the adoption of an RPS by state.
The authors observed that the gross state product, the growth rate of population,
the level of education, and the share of coal in electricity generation have a positive
effect on the adoption of an RPS by a state. In addition, they observed that the
expenditure on natural resources and the political party dominance have a negative
influence on the adoption of an RPS by a state. It must be noted that the authors
acknowledges some important limitations in his study. In particular, he observes
that the lack of data about the distribution of natural resources expenditure affects
the representability of the model. In addition, since the work is not a panel data
analysis, Huang et. al are not able to account for the time evolution of the variables
considered (Huang et al., 2007).
Lyon and Yin (2008) conducted a study similar to Huang et al. (2007) but
11 A

penetration rate, defined as the number of active electricity customers within a
specific population, provides an indicator of whether residential customers are receiving
electricity services or not.
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solving Huang’s timing problem using a panel data analysis. By collecting historical
data they analyzed empirically the political and economic factors that induce the
state Government’s decision to adopt an RPS. Lyon and Yin observed that states
with high wind potential, high amounts of air pollution, and a majority presence
of democrats in state legislature is more likely to adopt an RPS. Also, the authors
observed that economic benefits are not important factors for legislators on whether
to adopt or not an RPS (Lyon and Yin, 2008).
Moreover, Li et.al (2008) investigated how much U.S. households are willing to
pay to support increased energy research and development activities with the objective of replacing fossil fuels. The authors collected data from a mixed mode telephone
and internet survey. Using a contingent valuation they estimated the annual households willingness to pay for national energy research. The authors observed that
perceptions of the “importance of energy issues, the need to reduce dependence on
foreign energy sources, and the benefits of development of crop-based fuels significantly and positively influence respondents’ support for the creation of a national
Energy Research and Development Fund” (Li et al., 2008, pp. 11).
To the best of my knowledge, Huang et. al (2007) is the most similar work to
this thesis.
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3.1

Hypothesis

This Master’s thesis investigates factors that affect the adoption of the Renewable
Portfolio Standards by individual states. Using a regression model, this thesis specifically studies the role of political views, energy endowment, electricity market, economic factors, and other variables related to pollution and geographical location, in
the adoption of the RPS and its ultimate target.
This work does not follow any specific work available in the literature; however, it
examines several similar aspects of the work presented by Huang et al. (2007). Since
both analysis employ cross sectional data, the results obtained for some variables
can be compared.
The data used in this work is selected following the general definition of RPS and
policy goal (Rader and Hempling, 2001). The data is divided into several categories
including RPS features, energy generation variables, geographical variables, political
variables, economic variables, electricity market variables, and pollution variables.
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Figure 3.1: NERC Interconnection Map. (Source: http://www.nerc.com, last accessed 12/01/2009.)

3.2

Data

The original data are collected from federal agencies, national laboratories and the
U.S. Census Bureau. The specific data sources include EIA, NREL, LBNL, Database
of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE), Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE), and the U.S. Census Bureau. For each state, all variables exhibiting
some direct or indirect relationship with the adoption of an RPS policy and/or
its specific goals, were carefully selected from the aforementioned data sources. It
must be mentioned that since some states already have adopted an RPS policy, the
presence or absence of RPS is coded here as a dummy variable. All the data collected
for this work are from 2006, which corresponds to the latest available information
released by EIA at the time this research was conducted.
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Dummy variable. If RPS is enacted in state then rps=1, otherwise rps=0

Total number of representatives by state in the congress.

Dummy variable. If the state has a democratic Governor the variable equal 1, otherwise is 0

Percentage of pro-environmental laws voted for each representative in 2006

Dummy variable. If the state is located in the East region the variable is 1, otherwise is 0

Energy produced from Biomass-Waste-Landfill Gas, MSW (Municipal Solid Waste)

rps!

represen

govd

henvscore

east

msw1
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Wood and derived fuels power generation. Variable unit is thousands of KWh

Total geothermal power generation in the state. Variable unit is thousands of KWh

Total hydroelectric power generation by conventional technology. Variable unit is thousands of KWh

Total Solar and Photovoltaic power generation in the state. Variable unit is

wood

geo

hydro

solarpv

2 EIA-Table

1 EIA-Table

Net power generation in the state. Variable unit is thousands of MWh

netgen2

1.18 Renewable Electric Power Sector Net Generation By Energy Source and State, 2006 (1000 of KWh)
A.1S elected Electric Industry Summary. Summary Statistic by State 2006 (MWh)

Table 3.1 – Continued on the next page

Total wind power generation in state. Variable unit is thousands of KWh

wind

thousands of KWh

Biomass-Waste-Other. Biomass power generation. Variable unit is thousands of KWh

otherbio

Variable units is thousands of KWh

Description, Value Encoding & Units

Name

Table 3.1: Data Description and Value Encoding
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Total renewable power generation installed in the state. Variable unit is thousands of MWh

Percentage of electricity generated using fossil fuels by state.

Percentage of electricity generated using hydropower generation by state.

Percentage of electricity generated using wind by state. Variable in %.

Amount of CO2 emissions produced by electricity generation in state.

totreinst

perfossil

perhydro

perwind

co23
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Average household income per capita by state. Variable units is U.S. dollars

Total population by state. Variable unit is number of habitants.

GDP in the state. Variable units is millions of U.S. dollars

Incpercap4

Population

gdp5

4 U.S.

by states 2006 in thousand metric tons
Census Bureau by state 2006
5 The data source for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was Table 5 of the U.S. Census Bureau of Economic: ‘Analysis in
Current-Dollar GDP by State, 2004-2007, Millions of dollars.’

3 EIA.Emissions

Average price of a KWh in the state. Variable unit is cents of dollars per KWh.

Variable unit is thousand metric tons.

Amount of SO2 emission produced by electricity generation in state.

Variable unit is thousand metric tons.

Amount of N O2 emissions produced by electricity generation in state.

price

so2

no2

Total Renewable Net power generation. Variable unit is thousands of MWh

trenetgen

Variable unit is thousand metric tons.

Description, Value Encoding & Units

Name

Table 3.1 – Continued from the previous page
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A description of the data is shown in Table 3.1 and the statistical description of
the data is listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Original Variables

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

0

1

RPS Features
rps

50

.7

.46291

Energy Generation Variables
trenetgen

50

7713.37

16142.97

.5

84510

msw

50

259250.5

445583.3

0

1824337

otherbio

50

19421.19

55346.61

0

275651

wood

50

206641.1

472662.4

0

2564861

geo

50

291360.6

1818452

0

1.28 ∗ 107

hydro

50

5725078

1.43 ∗ 107

0

8.19 ∗ 107

solarpv

50

10154.12

69929.8

0

494572

wind

50

531782.7

1226206

0

6670515

netgen

50

8.12 ∗ 107

7.40 ∗ 107

5967725

4.01 ∗ 108

Geographical variables
east

50

.26

.4430875

0

1

Political variables
govd

50

.44

.5014265

0

1

represen

50

9.02

9.692181

1

53

henvscore

50

44.6807

18.65746

0

96.25

Economic variables
population

50

5976420

6662378

515000

3.65 ∗ 107

incpercap

50

61113.84

9300.077

44769

82404

Table 3.2 – Continued on the next page
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Table 3.2 – Continued from the previous page
Variable
gdp6

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

50

260635.3

314765.7

23628

1742172

Electricity market variables
price

50

8.842857

3.322409

4.92

20.72

Pollution variables
CO2

50

49193.98

46918.3

10

257552

SO2 7

49

194.3469

236.5193

1

970

N O2

49

77.5102

61.27198

2

260

Regarding the RPS data, the information collected about the policy design includes: the type of target (mandatory or non-mandatory), the mechanism for complying with the target (the use of REC or not), the type of utility to which the
target is applied, whether the target can be complied with importing energy from
other states or other regions, the compliance year, ultimate target generation within
the region, whether the RPS allows a utility to buy electricity from generators outside
of the state, the capacity of currently installed generation, whether the electricity will
be transmitted directly to the customers, and whether all the electricity generated
using renewables must be generated within the NERC region of the electric grid (see
Fig. 3.1) to which a state belongs (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). This specific information is summarized in Table 3.3. Detailed information about rules, regulations and
policies for the RPS, for each state, were obtained from the DSIRE8 and from the
LBNL9 . As already mentioned, some RPS policies include REC trading as a valid
means to comply with the requirements of the policy. For the purpose of this thesis
REC trading is not considered in the numerical analysis.
6 GDP

of the state
VT does not data for emission of CO2 and SO2
8 by North Carolina Solar Center, (last accessed 05/20/2009).
9 “RPS in the USA A status report with date through 2007.”
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2001

2003

2007

2000

2007

2005

CA

CO

CT

DE

HI

Target

Year

Eligible

Plants

Existing

Minimums

Tiers, or

Set-Asides,

39
20% (2020)

20% (2019)

Yes

Yes

Yes

None
Table 3.3 – Continued on the next page

Energy Efficiency

Fuel Cells

New/Existing

Wind

Solar,

None

Solar,

Technologies

Class I/II

Ownership

POUs
23% (2020)

Community

In-State,

None

None

10% (2020):

Solar

None

Distributed Generation

Solar,

Yes

Yes

No

Multipliers

Credit

IOUs

20% (2020):

20% (2010)

15% (2025)

Mandatory RPS Obligations

Ultimate

Current

Compliance

AZ

State

First

cies (Wiser and Barbose, 2008)

Table 3.3: Selected Design Elements of State RPS Poli-
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1999

2000

2006

2003

2002

2008

2003

2008

IA

ME

MD

MA

MN
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MT

NV

NH

23.8% (2025)

20% (2015)

15% (2015)

Yes

Yes

No
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Existing Biomass/

None

Waste Tire

Energy Efficiency
Solar, New,

PV, DG,Eff,

None

None

None

Technologies

Class I/II

None

None

None

Multipliers

Credit

Solar,

Community Wind

Renewables

Community-Based

Xcel

Wind for Xcel;

None

Solar,

New/Existing

None

Wind

Minimums

Tiers, or

Set-Asides,

Goal for

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Eligible

Plants

Existing

30% (2020):

25% (2025)

9% (2014)

9.5% (2022)

40% (2017)

105 MW (1999)

25% (2025)

Target

Year

2008

Ultimate

Current

Compliance

IL

State

First
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2006

2010

2011

NY

NC

OR

2006

NM

None

None

None

None

None

Multipliers

Credit
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and small-scale

5-10%(2025)

Goal for

Energy Efficient

Poultry Waste,

Solar, Swine waste,

community-based

No

Yes

Distributed Generation

Large

25%(2025)

10% (2018)

IOUs

12.5%(2021):

24%(2013)

Distributed Generation

Co-ops

Solar, Wind,

ClassI/II Technologies

Solar,

Methane, Existing Hydro

Minimums

Tiers, or

Set-Asides,

Geothermal or Biomass,

Yes

Yes

Yes

Eligible

Plants

Existing

10%(2020):

IOU

20%(2020):

22.5% (2021)

Target

Year

2001

Ultimate

Current

Compliance

NJ

State

First
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2001

2007

2002

2012

2007

2000

2012

2015

2006

2010

RI

TX

WA

DC

WI

MO

ND

VT

VA

Target

Year

42
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Eligible

Plants

Existing

Methane

Technologies

12%(2022)

Up To 10%(2012)

10%(2015)

11%(2020)

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

None

None

None

None

Wind, Solar

None

None

To Do So

PSC Authorized

None

Solar,

Class I/II

None

Wind,

Distributed Generation

All Non-Wind

None

None

Multipliers

Credit

Solar,

None

Goal for non-wind

New/existing

solar

renewables

Minimums

Tiers, or

Set-Asides,

Non-Biding Renewable Energy Goals

10%(2015)

11%(2022)

15%(2020)

5.880MW(2015)

16%(2019)

8%(2020)

Small

Ultimate

Current

Compliance

PA

State

First
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Most of the data related to energy variables were collected from EIA. See Table 3.4. Variables representing the existing infrastructure for renewable electricity
generation, include the renewable sources for electricity generation such as wind,
biomass, geothermal, and water in the case of hydrogeneration. In addition, information such as the renewable installed electricity generation, the energy consumption
per person, the ethanol production, and the coal production by state, were obtained
from the EERE. In particular, the data was taken from the Renewable Energy Data
Book, which compiles data from EIA, Navigant consulting, American Wind Energy
Association (AWEA), Geothermal Energy Association (GEA), and the NREL. The
information taken from the EIA, see Table 3.4, includes the renewable electricity generation by state, the total net summer renewable capacity (in megawatts (MWs)),
the total renewable net generation (in thousands of MWh), and the renewable electric
power net generation in 2006 (in MWh). The specific renewable sources considered
for electricity generation are MSW, other biomass, wood, geothermal, hydroelectric
conventional, solar photovoltaic, and wind.
The geographical information is related to the NERC regions (see Fig. 3.1).
NERC divides the country in three main zones: East, West and Texas. Each zone
has different characteristics related to the grid infrastructure including transmission
connections between the states, quantity of generation using fossil fuels, consumption
per person, etc. The eastern part of the country has a high presence of transmission
lines. This large number of lines is a consequence of the high population level and
industrialization in those states. The West has few transmission interconnections
and less population than the eastern part of the country. Due to the fact that Texas
is only one state, the NERC region, is coded using a dummy variable as follows:
east=1 if the state is in the east NERC and east=0 otherwise. The geographical
information was collected from the following sources: the NERC, the EIA, and a
transmission report from the Department of Energy (DOE)10 .
10 National

Transmission Grid Study, the honorable Spencer Abraham, Secretary of En-
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Table 3.4: EIA Energy Tables by State
Information

Table
Number
1.18
Renewable Electric Power sector Net Generation by source and State
2006, (in thousand of Kilowatts) information released on July 2008
1.19
Renewable Commercial and Industrial Sector Net generation by
Energy Source and State 2006, (in thousand of kilowatts)
information released in July 2008
1.19
Renewable Commercial and Industrial Sector Net generation by
Energy Source and State 2006, (in thousand of kilowatts)
information released in July 2008
1.19
Renewable Commercial and Industrial Sector Net generation by
Energy Source and State 2006, (in thousand of kilowatts)
information released in July 2008
1.20
Total Renewable Net Generation by Energy Source and State, 2006,
(in thousand of kilowatts)
1.24
Renewable Electric Power Sector Net Capacity by
Energy Source and State, 2006, (in Megawatts)

The data related to political variables quantifies the state policy-makers’ percentage of approval of pro-environmental laws. Such information was taken from the
National Environmental Scorecard published by the League of Conservation Voters
(LCV). The variable henvscore represents the percentage of pro-environmental laws
voted for each state representative in 2006. The other political variable, which is
denoted by govd, codes each state’s Governor’s political party in 2006. The variable govd was treated as a dummy variable, where a value 0 represents a republican
senator and the value 1 represents a democratic senator.
It is well known that the electricity demand is strongly correlated with the GDP.
Since the electricity demand data is not easily available, GDP was used as a proxy
variable for the electricity demand. The total population for each state in 2006 was
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau as well.
ergy U.S. Department of Energy, May 2002.
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Figure 3.2: NERC Regions and Balancing Authorities. The map reflects the degree
of interconnection for each region. (Source: http://www.nerc.com, (last accessed
12/01/2009))

Regarding electricity market variables, the data considered in this analysis are:
the electricity price per KWh, the net electricity generation, the main fuel used for
electricity generation, and the council authority. The source of this information is
the EIA.
Finally, this study considers pollution variables. A major environmental problem
is emissions produced by fossil fuels combustion during electricity generation. Emissions of SO2 , N O2 , and CO2 are the pollutants considered in this work. Data on
air pollution produced by GHG emissions in 2006 were found from EIA. The data
employed in this work considers only emissions produced during the generation of
electricity.
A description of the data is shown in Table 3.1 and the statistical description of
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the data is listed Table 3.2. The District of Columbia and the state of Hawaii are
not listed in these tables because they have not been considered in this analysis. In
addition, information on the emission of SO2 and N O2 for the state of Vermont is
not available.
Based on these variables several new variables were generated. The variable
rpstarget was generated combining the dummy variable rps (see Table 3.2) with the
variable ultimate target (see Table 3.3) in order to create the dependent variable.
In the analysis, this variable incorporates more information than the binary variable
rps. The variable rpstarget represents the specific information about the target
value and the presence of the RPS policy in the state. Also, the variable gdpcapita
was created by taking the ratio between the gdp and the total population of the
state. In addition, a variable quantifying the relative amount of fossil fuel used
in the generation of electricity (perfossil ) was generated using the total amount of
generated energy. Table 3.5 presents a statistical description of the new variables
created from the original variables listed in Table 3.2. The variables listed in Table
3.5 correspond to the set of variables used to investigate which variables explain
adoption and ultimate target for states’ RPS in the U.S..
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of the New Variables

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

11

Min

Max

RPS
rps

50

.7

.4629

0

1

rpstarget

50

11.5560

10.3098

0

40

Energy Generation Variables
biomass

50

.0081

.0209

0

.1101

perfossil

50

88.1074

20.1722

14.1802

100

Table 3.5 – Continued on the next page
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Table 3.5 – Continued from the previous page
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

perhydro

50

10.0018

19.5893

0

83.9855

perwind

50

.7181

1.1594

0

5.0960

retotal

50

7043698

1.60 ∗ 1007

0

8.38 ∗ 1007

0

1

Geographical Variables
east

50

.26

.4431

Political Variables
henvscore

50

44.6807

18.6575

0

96.25

govd

50

.44

.50143

0

1

Economical Variables
gdp

50

260635.3

314765.7

23628

1742172

gdpcapita

50

36.0875

6.6217

24.062

59.288

population

50

5976420

6662378

515000

3.65 ∗ 1007

Electricity Market Variables
price

50

8.842857

3.322409

4.92

20.72

Pollution Variables

3.3

no2

49

77.5102

61.2720

2

260

so2

49

194.3469

236.5193

1

970

Econometric Model

To investigate the factors that effect adoption of and ultimate target for RPS policies
in the U.S. I formulate an econometric model using the new variable rpstarget which
represents the percentage of electricity generated using renewables in order to reach
as a RPS’s goal by each state that adopted the RPS. Because the variable rpstarget
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falls into the category of a corner solution response variable, a Tobit model is applied
in the analysis.
The variables investigated are associated with factors believed to be affect RPS
adoption. Those variables are:

• Political: henvscore and govd. The variable henvscore represents the percentage of pro-environmental laws approved by the House of Representatives in
Washington D.C. for each state. Based on the assumption that representatives
tendency in the state is to approve environmentally friendly laws, state policymakers will be inclined to approve a policy to incentivize the use of renewable
resources in electricity generation. Thus, it is expected that the henvscore coefficient will be positive. The variable govd represents a Governor’s political
party as a dummy. If the Governor is a Democrat govd is one, and zero otherwise. It is expected that the Governor’s political party may be an important
variable in the analysis, and can influence RPS adoption.
• Geographical: east. The East region is expected to be an important proxy of
specific technical and economic characteristics of the electricity market and the
power grid, including transmission infrastructure, electricity market transactions, interconnection between states, level of industrialization, electricity demand, etc. A high level of industrialization yields a large amount of pollution
in the region. Also, such level of industrialization demands a large number of
interconnections between the transmission lines, thereby facilitating the REC
transactions activities. This variable is expected to have a positive impact on
the adoption of the RPS because most of the states in the eastern part of the
U.S. have a large number of interconnected transmission lines because of the
high level of industrialization. The large number of transmission lines is a base
for the developing REC market, a good alternative for the local utilities to
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comply the RPS’s target12 . Then the east states adopting an RPS policy could
decrease the local emissions from generation plants.
• Related to Energy infrastructure variables: perfossil, perhydro, and perwind
were generated. These variables represent the percentage of electricity generated using fossil fuels, hydropower, and wind, respectively. Most of the states
generate the majority of their electricity using coal or gas. Moreover, some of
them are also producers of coal or gas; which can lower the cost of electricity
generation. It is believed that the perfossil variable will have a negative impact
on the adoption of the RPS, because adopting the policy would require an investment in infrastructure for renewable energy generation, and simultaneously,
decreasing the demand for fossil fuels, causing a negative economic impact on
the state. The perhydro variable is of interest because there are some states
where a high percentage of their electricity generation is from hydropower generation. If these states adopt the RPS policy, power generators will have an
opportunity to sell their extra energy production to other states with a strict
mandatory RPS policy. For this reason, the RPS policy of each state specifies whether hydropower generation is accepted as a renewable energy source
to comply the policy target. Recall that the variable perwind represents the
percentage of electricity generated using wind. Only the state of Texas has the
resources and conditions to reliably generate electrical energy using wind while
complying with an RPS target. I would expect a positive sign for perwind.
• Related to electricity market: price. The variable price represents the average
price per KWh in each state. Adopting an RPS policy in a state would need
to increase the investment in new technologies to generate electricity using
renewables or purchase from out of state and this will increase the electricity
price. Clearly this is not a popular measure, and it is expected to have a
12 If

the state adopt an RPS where the utilities can comply only buying RECs from the
state which adopted the policy and not form others.

49

Chapter 3. Analysis

negative impact on the adoption of an RPS policy.
• Other economic variables: starting from the variables gdp and population, the
new variable gdpcapita has been generated, where gdpcapita represents the
GDP per capita in each state. In economic analysis, the GDP is usually employed as an education proxy. Like Huang in 2007, following the concept of
the environmental Kuznet’s inverted “U”hypothesis. I would expect to have a
positive impact on the adoption of the RPS policy for gdpcapita (Huang et al.,
2007).
• Variables for pollution levels: no2 and so2. The no2 and so2 are variables
associated with the combustion of fossil fuels used in electricity generation.
If the concentration of the GHG emission is high, people will be aware of
the consequence of pollution and will apply pressure on the policy-makers to
approve an RPS policy.
The statistical summary of the variables used in the analysis are listed in the Table 3.5.
A Tobit model is applied under the assumptions that errors are normally distributed and homoskedastic.

rpstargeti =f (perf ossili , perhydroi , perwindi , easti , henvscorei , govdi , pricei ,
gdpcapitai , no2i , so2i ) + i . , with i = 1, ....., N

(3.1)

The notation used by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) has been adopted here to specify a Tobit model for the observed dependent variable rpstarget. The yi =rpstarget i
is a function of the independent variables, Xi , i = 1, . . . , 9, where X1 = perf ossil,
X2 = perhydro, X3 = perwind, X4 = east, X5 = henvscore, X6 = gdpcapita,
X7 = govd, X8 = no2, and X9 = so2.
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The observed latent variable, y ∗ , in the Tobit econometric model representation
is shown in

yi∗ = Xi β + εi , i = 1, ..., N

(3.2)

where εi ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), and Xi denotes the (9 x 1) vector of exogenous and fully
observed regressors. The observed variable yi is related to the latent variable yi∗
through the observation rule represented in equation 3.3:


y ∗ if y ∗ > L
i
i
, i = 1, ..., N.
y=

L if yi ≤ L

(3.3)

The definition of yi = rpstarget is shown in equation (3.4). Where L = 0 is the
corner response value when the target does not exist for a given state because the
state has not adopted an RPS. So, the relationship between the observed variable
and the unobserved variable in the Tobit model is represented by:


rpstarget∗ if rpstarget∗ > 0
i
i
rpstargeti =
, i = 1, ..., N

0
if rpstargeti ≤ 0

(3.4)

In general, the probability of a corner response observation is represented in the
equation
P r(yi∗


≤ 0) = P r(Xi β + ε ≤ 0) = Φ

Xi β
σ


,

(3.5)

where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Specifically, in
the Tobit model setting used here, L = 0, and the probability of a corner response
observation is presented as:
P r(yi∗


≤ 0) = P r(Xi β + ε ≤ 0) = Φ
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Xi β
σ


.

(3.6)
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The expected value of the observed variable y for the non-zero observations is shown
in 3.7:
E(yi |Xi , yi > 0) = Xi β + σ

φ
Φ

Xi β
σ
,
Xi β 0
σ



(3.7)

where φ(·) is the standard normal density and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function.
When a Tobit model has a corner response data with L = 0, the density function
has two components, the positive and zero observations with d = 1 and d = 0
respectively (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005):

1−di
 

 di
1
1
Xi β
2
.
f (yi ) = √
exp − 2 (yi − Xi β)
1−Φ
2σ
σ
2πσ 2

(3.8)

In the equation (3.8) the second term represents the likelihood of the corner
response observation. The maximum likelihood estimates (β, σ 2 ) solve the first order
conditions from the maximization of the log-likelihood based on the density function
in equation (3.8)13 . The log-likelihood function for each observation i is shown in
equation (3.9) (Wooldridge, 2006):

 ln 1 − Φ Xi β 
, yi = 0
σ


LLi (β, σ) =
.
 ln 1 (yi − φ Xi β
,
y
>
0
i
σ
σ

3.4
3.4.1

(3.9)

Analysis
Regression Results

Using a sample of 48 out of the 50 observations for each variable listed in Table 3.5,
the vector of estimated β coefficients for the Tobit model has been computed.
13

It

The optimization was solved using the software STATA version 10.1 on a computer
equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo T6400 processor running at 2.00 GHz, a RAM
of 4 GB, and a 64-bits operating system.
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must be noted that the analysis does not include DC neither the states of HI and
VT. DC is not included because there is no information for the variable henvscore.
The state of HI is not included in the geographical area because is not part of the
continent, and the state of VT is not included because there is no information for
the variables no2 and so2 from this state.
The calculation of the covariance/correlation of the βb was performed by enabling
the option of robust calculation of such matrix. The calculated parameters for the
Tobit regression model as well as the t-statistics of the model are listed in the Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Estimation Results: A Tobit Model
Tobit regression
Number of obs. = 48
F(10, 38) = 5.21
Prob > F = 0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood = -130.08419
P seudoR2 = 0.1217
Robust
rpstarget
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
∗∗∗
perfossil
-2.3061
.8357
-2.76 0.009
-3.9978 -.6144
perhydro
-2.2846∗∗∗
.8409
-2.72 0.010
-3.9868 -.5824
-1.0406
1.472974 -0.71 0.484
-4.0224 1.9413
perwind
∗
east
7.5828
4.031
1.87
0.069
-.6275 15.6931
.3143∗∗∗
.0910
3.45
0.001
.1299 .4986
henvscore
govd
.2858
3.185414 0.09
0.929
-6.1627 6.7344
∗
gdpcapita
.0004
.0002
1.73
0.091
-.0001 .0011
price
.3250
.5484
0.59
0.557
-.7852 1.4351
no2
-.03561
.0404
-0.88 0.383
-.1173 .0461
so2
.0151
.0143
1.06
0.297
-.0138 .0440
constant
202.8698∗∗ 81.24664 2.50
0.017 38.39461 367.345
/sigma
9.0367
.8962
7.2225 10.8509
Obs. summary:

15 left-censored observations at rpstarget ≤ 0
33 uncensored observations
0 right-censored observations
Significant at:

∗

10%,

∗∗

5%, and

∗∗∗

1%

It can be seen from the results for the Tobit model shown in Table 3.6 that three
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variables are significant at the 1% level, one variable is significant at the 5% level,
and two variables are significant at the 10% level. These significant variables are
perfossil, perhydro, east, henvscore, gdpcapita, and the constant.

• The variable perfossil has a negative sign and is significant at 1%. The perfossil
variable represents the percentage of electricity generated using fossil fuels,
specifically coal. A negative sign for the coefficient of perfossil indicates that
states where a large percentage of electricity generation comes from fossil fuels,
will be less inclined to adopt an RPS policy, or to establish a high RPS target.
A possible explanation is that states with high portion of electricity generation
using fossil fuels are also producers of those fuels, or are geographically close
to producers of coal, gas or oil. Moreover, in coal-rich states political pressure
may exist to sustain the fossil fuel industry.
• The variable perhydro has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level.
The perhydro variable represents the percentage of electricity generated using
hydropower in the state. An explanation for the negative sign in the coefficient associated with perhydro is related to the investment in new technologies.
Usually states with high percentage of electricity coming from hydropower
generation do not experience a high level of air pollution from electricity generation. They may not feel inclined to invest in new expensive technologies for
generation of electricity using renewables, such as solar, wind and geothermal.
States with high percentage of hydropower generation may perceive RPS adoption as an business opportunity of selling “clean electricity” to other states in
the form of a REC. Usually buyer states have a mandatory RPS with a high
target and high levels of air pollution and they do not have enough capacity
to generate the amount of clean electricity required to comply their RPS state
target. Moreover, only small hydropower generation plants are considered as
“clean electricity generators” (at most 20 MW), while large hydropower plants
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are typically not supplying power that can be used for RPS compliance whether
it is for own use or for sale as a REC.
• The variable east has a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. Recall
that the variable east is a proxy of specific technical and economical characteristics of the electricity market. This variable was expected to have a positive
impact on the adoption of an RPS policy because the eastern region of the
U.S. has a large number of transmission interconnections, which are needed to
develop a REC market. Thus, the geographical location will have a positive
influence in the adoption of the RPS.
• The variable henvscore has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.
States with house representatives that approve a high percentage of environmental laws will also be more inclined to approve an RPS policy.
• The variable gdpcapita has a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. A
higher GDP per capita is associated with high education levels, which implies
that the population may be more concerned about pollution problems. Also,
a higher the GDP per capita means people are better able to pay for increased
power prices after the implementations of an RPS.
• The last significant variable is the constant, which is significant at the 5%
level. The constant includes the effect of all those variables not included in the
regression. These variables have not been included here for several reasons, one
reason is being the limited number of observations. With additional variables,
the degree of freedom is quickly observed.
Some variables that are of interest to include were not significant, but important
for the RPS adoption. One of these variables is perwind, which represents the percentage of the electricity generated using wind in each state. It must be noted that
most of the states do not have good conditions to permanently and reliably generate
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amounts of electricity using wind. An exception is Texas, which has favorable conditions and resources for investing in the technology needed for using wind to generate
electricity. Most other states do not consider wind generation as a factor of influence
in the decision to adopt an RPS policy in the state or use wind to comply the RPS’s
target. The others not significant variables are govd, price, no2, and so2.
The results of the regression show that Tobit model has a pseudo (Mc Fadden)
R2 metric equal to 0.1217. However, it is well-known that this result metric does
not represent accurately the statistical significance level of the model (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009, 2005; Baum, 2006). In addition an R2 metric, which is denoted here as
ρ2 , was calculated as squared correlation between the predicted dependent variable
predicted and the observed dependent variable. It must be mentioned that this
ρ2 value is somewhat comparable to the standard R2 metric for the statistics of the
residual errors in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Wooldridge, 2006). For
the data used in this work, the computed ρ2 is 0.5482. (The complete result provided
by Stata for ρ2 is shown in the Table 3.7.) A OLS regression was also estimated in
order to compare those results with the results of the Tobit model. It must be
highlighted that since both models rely on different mathematical assumptions, a
direct comparison is impossible. Table 3.8 lists the coefficients for the Tobit and the
OLS regression models. It can be observed that the coefficients of the significant
variables in both models have the same sign and roughly the same significance.
Table 3.7: ρ2 Value
Correlate xb rpstarget
(obs=48)
xb
rpstarget
xb
1.0000
rpstarget 0.7404 1.0000
display r(ρ2 ) = 0.54824064

In this thesis the explanatory variables considered are socioeconomic, political,
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Table 3.8: OLS and Tobit Models
Model
OLS
Tobit
Variable
perfossil
-2.09∗∗∗
-2.31∗∗∗
perhydro
-2.08∗∗
-2.28∗∗∗
perwind
-1.37
-1.04
∗
east
5.55
7.53∗
∗∗∗
henvscore
.212
.314∗∗∗
govd
.497
.286
∗
gdpcapita
.00031
.00039∗
price
.119
.325
no2
-.0372
-.0356
so2
.0123
.0151
∗∗
195
203∗∗
constant
sigma
9.04
2
ρ
0.5559
0.5482
log-likelihood
-130
∗
∗∗
Significant at: 10%, 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%

and environmental; however, these variables are not the same as those used by Huang
et al. (2007) in their work. Huang et al. used in their analysis the following variables:
the gross state product, the population growth rate, the level of education, the
political party dominance, the expenditure on natural resources and the share of
coal in electricity generation. None of these variables are used here. Comparing the
variables among the two studies, it can be noted that only the gross state product
is similar to an explanatory variable used here: the GDP per capita. Given that
similarity, I can compare the effect of both variables on the adoption of an RPS by
a state. It turns out that both studies reach the same conclusion: the effect of the
GDP and the gross state product is positive on the adoption of an RPS by state.
This reinforces the idea that states with larger GDP will be more concerned about
the environment and the use of renewable energy in electricity generation (Huang
et al., 2007).
The political variable in Huang’s work is a dummy equal to one when the major-
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ity of the state’s representatives in the Senate and the House are republican. This
political variable is significant with a negative sign; states with majority of republican representatives both Houses of congress are less likely to adopt an RPS policy.
In this thesis, the political variable represents the percentage of environmental approved laws by the House’s representatives in each state regardless of the political
party dominance. Here the variable henvscore is significant, i.e., a state with representatives approving a large percentage of environmental laws is more likely to
adopt a RPS policy. As we can see, the Huang et al.’s political variable, political
party dominance in the state, and the henvscore are different variables and cannot
be compared in a direct fashion.

3.4.2

Marginal Effect Estimates

After running the Tobit model with corner response data, some post-estimation
analysis and model diagnostic tests were conducted in order to predict a range of
quantities, the default linear prediction produces the sample fitted values of the
unobserved (latent) variable y ∗ for all observation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009), the latent variable mean is represented
by
∂E(y|X, y > 0)
= 1 − ωλ(ω) − λ(ω)2 β
∂X

(3.10)

0

with ω = X β/σ and λ(ω) = φ(ω)/Φ(ω).
First, the marginal effects of the regression coefficients are calculated. Results
for the marginal effects are shown in Table 3.9. Regressors with significant marginal
effects correspond to the same variables appearing as significant in the Tobit model,
and also, have the same sign. These variables are gdpcapita and east significant
at the level of 10%, while perfossil, perhydro, and henvscore are significant at the
level 1%. From these results for the marginal effect, it can be concluded that: (i)
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when the regressor gdpcapita increases in 1%, such increment affects the rpstarget
positively increasing it by 0.03%; (ii) the regressor east, a dummy variable, shifts
up the intercept point of the dependent variable rpstarget in 5.22 units when east
changes from zero to one

14

. (iii) when the regressor perfossil increases in 1%, such

increment affects the rpstarget negatively decreasing it by 1.47%; (iv) when the
regressor perhydro increases in 1%, its effect on the dependent variable rpstarget is
to decrease it by 1.46%; and (v) when the regressor henvscore increases in 1%, such
increment affects the rpstarget by increasing it 0.2%, approximately.
Table 3.9: Marginal Effects
Marginal Effects After Tobit
y = E(rpstarget|rpstarget > 0)(predict, e(0, .))
y = 11.822108
variable
dy/dx
Std. Err.
z
P > |z|
[ 95% C.I.]
perfossil
-1.4743∗∗∗
.5630
-2.62
0.009
-2.5778
-.3708
∗∗∗
perhydro -1.4606
.5676
-2.57
0.010
-2.5729
-.3482
perwind
-.6652
.94951
-0.70
0.484
-2.52622 1.1958
east†
5.2263∗
3.0553
1.71
0.087
-.7621
11.2146
henvscore
.2009∗∗∗
.0559
3.60
0.000
.0915
.31042
govd†
.1829
2.0373
0.09
0.928
-3.8101
4.1758
∗
gdpcapita
.0003
.00014
1.75
0.080
-.00003
.0005
price
.2077
.3485
0.60
0.551
-.4754
.8909
no2
-.0227
.0261
-0.87
0.384
-.0740
.0285
so2
.0096
.0092
1.05
0.296
-.0084
.02772
(†)dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Significant at: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%

3.4.3

X
88.222
9.9398
.7449
.2708
44.7232
.4583
36136.3
8.7902
76.4167
184.125

Test for Normality and Homoskedasticity

Tests for the normality and homoskedasticity of the residual errors were conducted
in order to check the validity of the assumptions of the Tobit model. The pro14 The

marginal effect of the dummy variable east must be analyzed differently as
in the case of continuous regressors. This effect is obtained as the difference between
E(rpstarget|east, rpstarget > 0), with east=0 and east=1.
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cedure to conduct these tests was obtained from Cameron and Trivedi (2009). It
must be highlighted that for a Tobit model the standard tests for the normality and
homoskedasticity of the errors, such as those implemented in the Stata commands
sktest and hettest, cannot be employed (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
First, to test for normality is it necessary to compute the generalized residuals.
Using the value of the Mills’ ratio for each regressor, λi , the residuals are computed
assuming that the dependent data has a corner response at L = 0. The generalized
residuals are then computed in order to employ conditional moment tests. Specifically, the first four conditional moments must be calculated. The theory for this
test was taken from Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Where “the first order conditions
for censored Tobit MLE suggest conditional moment test based on the generalized
residual” (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 544).
e i = di

φi
yi − Xi β
− (1 − di )
2
σ
σ(1 − Φi )

(3.11)

“If the Tobit model is correctly specified then E[ei |Xi ] = 0 since the regularity
conditions imply that E[∂lnf (yi )/∂β] = 0” (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 544).
Then, an m-test must be implemented, where the null-hypothesis is H0 : E[eZ] = 0
and the alternative hypothesis is H0 : E[eZ] 6= 0. Generalized residuals for the Tobit
regression, as discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), were computed. The results
for the generalized residuals are shown in Table 3.10. It must be noticed that the
generalized residuals are not close enough to zero, (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
Using the log-likelihood “scores,” the Stata program can compute λbi , Xi using an
auxiliary regression with a constant value equal to one

15

.

The final result obtained for the N R2 statistic is N R2 = 47.936125 with p-value =
3.898 ∗ 10−11 . This value means a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of normality
distribution of the errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The reason for this problem
could be the small data size used in this work, and also, the effect of the omitted
15 Details

are explain in (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009)
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significant variables which are absorbed by the constant of the model. The coding for
the generalized residuals 1 is gres1 and in the same way were namely the generalized
residuals 2,3 and 4.
Table 3.10: Summarize generalized residuals
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
gres1
48
.2534
.8102
-1.6487 2.0657
48
-.2930
.9716
-.9915 3.2670
gres2
gres3
48
.5408
1.9853
-4.4812 8.8143
gres4
48 -1.5758
3.4895
-2.9999 15.2074

In order to double check the results of the normality test, an alternative test
for normality was conducted. Specifically Drukker (2002) developed a procedure to
correct distortions generated in the test provided by Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
The procedure tests the null hypothesis of normal distribution of the errors and it
is implemented in the Stata command tobcm 16 . The result of this alternative test is
shown in the Table 3.11, and confirms that the errors are not normally distributed.
Table 3.11: Pseudo R2
Conditional moment test against the null of normal errors
CM
Prob > χ2
10.611 0.00496

Next, the presence of homoskedasticity in the Tobit model was tested. The
test was conducted using the generalized residuals and the procedure described in
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Since the test assumes a null hypothesis for the presence of homoskedasticity, according to the result obtained, this hypothesis is strongly
rejected. As a consequence, the residual errors exhibit heteroscedasticity, that is, the
variance of the residual errors are different between each other.
16 The

Stata command tobcm can only be used when the dependent variable is censored
at or has a corner response at zero, as in the case treated here.
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Since the underlying assumptions of the Tobit model are not satisfied, one may argue that the Tobit model is not an appropriate representation of the data. Wooldridge
(2006) presents an informal procedure to test the suitability of the Tobit model. The
procedure consists in fitting a Probit model, where the value zero is given for all
those values at the left corner data and the value one is for the values greater that
the value of left corner. Note that for the case under analysis, this case is fitting a
Probit model where the dependent variable is the original dummy variable rps. Once
the Probit model is calculated, the coefficients of such model (denoted by γi ) can be
used to indicate if the Tobit model is appropriate.
The procedure by Wooldridge (2006) suggest that if a Tobit model holds, then
one can roughly estimate the coefficients of a Probit model (denoted by γ̂i ), which
uses exactly the same regressors as the Tobit model, by taking the ratio between
the coefficients of the Tobit model, and the standard deviation of the residual errors
(Wooldridge, 2006). In Table 3.12 the estimated coefficients (estimated using the
Tobit model) as well as the actual coefficients of the Probit model are shown. This
estimation will never be perfect due to sampling errors; however, consistency between
the order of magnitude and the sign of the significative coefficients must be found
(Wooldridge, 2006). If the estimates are not consistent with the actual coefficients,
there is an indication that the Tobit model does not hold. From Table 3.12 it can
be observed that the significant coefficients of the Probit model and their estimates,
which are calculated using the coefficients of the Tobit model and the standard
deviation of the errors, have the same sign and have roughly the same order of
magnitude. In summary, according to the procedure presented by Wooldridge it can
be (informally) concluded that the Tobit model is an appropriate representation of
the data (Wooldridge, 2006). However, because of lack of normality the hypothesis
test may provide the wrong conclusions about the factors that affect states adoption
of an RPS.
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Table 3.12: Comparison between regression coefficients of a Tobit and a Probit model
Tobit model Probit model
γ̂i = βi /σ
γi
∗∗
perfossil
-0.3150
-1.3757
perhydro
-0.3121∗∗
-1.3605
perwind
-0.1421
-0.7523
east
1.0289
0.9707
∗∗
henvscore
0.0429
0.0733
govd
0.0390
-0.5107
gdpcapita
0.00005
0.00004
price
0.0444
0.2450
no2
-0.0049
0.0063
so2
0.0021
-0.0012
∗
cons
27.7107
130.6430
Significant at: ∗ 5%, ∗∗ 1%, and ∗∗∗ 0.1%
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4.1

Conclusions

The Tobit regression model may be the most appropriate model for representing the
corner solution data type associated with the RPS goal studied in this thesis because
of the high proportion of zeroes. However, the Tobit model is only capable of yielding
reliable regression results and hypothesis test if errors are normally distributed and
homoskedastic.
For the Tobit model obtained in this thesis work, the regression errors do not satisfy the conditions of normality of errors and homoskedasticity. Since the regression
errors do not satisfy the underlying assumptions of the Tobit model, this indicates
that data collected exhibits problems that affects the model results. The major problems faced during the data collection are the low number of observations and that
some crucial data are not available, such as information on investment in renewable
generation, transmission conditions in the states, and REC trading.
An estimate of the representability of the data by the Tobit model, using the
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squared correlation between the observed and predicted dependent variable, is 54%.
An OLS regression achieves an R2 of 55%. Since the goodness of fit metrics are close,
someone could be tempted to draw the conclusion that the data may be represented
using an OLS regression. However, since the data associated to the RPS target
corresponds to a corner solution response, a simple OLS regression is not a valid
model because it would yield negative predictions and biased coefficient estimates.
Therefore, only the Tobit model yields a valid representation for the data.
It was mentioned that the analysis conducted here is similar to the one presented
in Huang et al. (2007) who consider socioeconomic, political, and environmental
factors impacting on the adoption of an RPS by a state. In this thesis the explanatory
variables considered are also socioeconomic, political, and environmental; however,
the specific variables employed here are not the same as those used by Huang et
al.. Huang et al. employed the following variables: the gross state product, the
growth rate population, the level of education, the political party dominance, the
expenditure on natural resources and the share of use coal in electricity generation.
Comparing the variables among the two studies, it can be noted that the gross state
product is similar to an explanatory variable used here: the GDP per capita. Given
that similarity, one can compare the effect of such variables on the adoption of an
RPS by a state. It turns out that both studies reach the same conclusion: the effect
of the GDP and the gross state product is positive on the adoption of an RPS by
state. This reinforces the idea that states with larger GDP will be more concerned
about the environment and the use of renewable energy in electricity generation.
In Huang et al.’s work, the variable level of education is positive and significant.
In this thesis the variable gdpcapita, which represents the GDP per capita, can be
associated with an indirect representation of the level of education. In both studies
these variables are significant and positive, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that
a state having a population with high level of income is more concerned about en-
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vironmental problems, and as a consequence, will be more likely to adopt an RPS
policy.
The variables growth rate population, expenditure on natural resources, share of
use coal in electricity generation, and political party dominance used in Huang et al.’s
work cannot be directly compared with the variables used in this thesis. In spite of
this fact, some conclusions will be drawn here for variables that are roughly similar.
In Huang’s work the political variable PPD is significant and negative, meaning that
the states with a republican party dominance are less likely to adopt an RPS policy.
On the contrary, the results of this thesis show that the political variable govd is not
significant in the adoption of an RPS by a state. Moreover, the political variable
henvscore is significant and positive. This means that states with representatives
approving a high percentage of environmental laws, are more likely to adopt a state
RPS policy regardless of their political tendency.
Finally, the environmental variable coal used in Huang’s work represents the percentage of electricity generated using coal. This variable is not significant according
to Huang’s results. In contrast with this result, the environmental variable perfossil used here is significant and negative. This variable represents the percentage of
electricity generated using any fossil fuel including coal. From this, states with high
percentage of electricity generated using fossil fuels are less likely to adopt a RPS
policy.

4.1.1

Future Work

In order to deal with the specification problems of the Tobit model, that is the lack
of normality and homoskedasticity in the residual errors, other non-trivial models
can be used. Among these models, the so-called hurdle or two-part models can be
used when a Tobit model seem not to represent the data. In these models, both the
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probability and the expectation of the non-corner response values, conditional on the
set of regressors, depend on different parameters. These parameters effect differently
the regressors and the conditional probabilities and expectations (Wooldridge, 2006).
One of the goals of an RPS policy is to reduce the emissions of pollutants in the
states where the policy is adopted. Several factors can play against this goal such as
the REC market, geographical and technical conditions, among others. By means of
a panel data analysis, using data from 1990 until 2006, one can test if the GHG have
been successfully reduced during the years that an RPS policy has been executed in
each state.
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5.1

Test for Homoskedasticity in TOBIT Regression and Complete Results of the Test for Homoskedasticity in TOBIT Regression
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24
24

48

47.9552
.04477

48
Coef.

Model

Residual

Total

one
0.0440
0.0193
0.0099
0.0100
0.0168
0.0589
0.0014
6.31E-06
0.0116

0.2794
-0.4335
0.0459
0.0462
0.0381
0.0765
-0.0006
1.13E-06
-0.0025

gres3

gres4

scoreperfossil

scoreperhydro

scoreperwind

scoreeast

scorehenvscore

scoregdpcapita

scoreprice

Std. Err.

df

SS

Source

sion

69
-0.21

0.18

-0.43

1.3

2.26

4.6

4.65

-22.44

6.36

t

1

.0019

1.9981

MS

-0.0264

-0.0000

-0.0035

-0.0451

0.0033

0.0255

0.0255

-0.4734

0.1887

0.0214

0.0000

0.0023

0.1980

0.0728

0.0669

0.0663

-0.3936

0.3701

[95% Conf. Interval]

.04319

0.9981

0.9991

0.0000

1071.06

48
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0.832

0.86

0.672

0.206

0.033

0

0

0

0

P > |t|

=

=

Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=

R-squared

=

=

F( 24, 24)
P rob > F

=

Number of obs

Table 5.1: Test for Homoskedasticity in TOBIT Regres-
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score2east

(dropped)

0.0376

0.0136

-0.0382

score2govd

score2perwind

0.0238

0.0001

score2so2

(dropped)

0.0001

-0.0003

score2no2

score2perhscore

0.0003

(dropped)

score2price

(dropped)

2.65E-06

2.79E-06

score2gdpcapita

score2perfossil

0.0006

(dropped)

score2perwind

0.0003

0.0098

0.0199

score2perhydro

score2henvscore

0.0099

0.0201

score2perfossil

0.0311

0.0376

-0.0231

scoregovd

-0.0093

0.0002

0.0004

scoreso2

score2east

0.0007

-0.0021

scoreno2

Std. Err.

Coef.

one

2.77

-1.61

0.74

0.0096

-0.0873

-0.0001

-0.0008

-2.67E-06

-0.0009

-0.0735

-0.0004

-0.0003

-0.1006

0.0000

-0.0037

0.0656

0.0108

0.0002

0.0003

8.25E-06

0.0015

0.0549

0.0402

0.0404

0.0545

0.0007

-0.0006

[95% Conf. Interval]
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0.011

0.121

0.464

0.376

0.302

1.06

-0.9

0.592

0.768

0.054

0.054

0.545

0.041

0.009

P > |t|

0.54

-0.3

2.03

2.03

-0.61

2.16

-2.85

t
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-1.7

-4.31

-0.49

t

0.102

0

0.626

P > |t|

-3.8350

-6.7196

-0.0169

N R2 = 47.9552 with p-value = 3.861 ∗ 10−11

0.3705

-2.3699

0.0104

[95% Conf. Interval]

display ”N R2 = ”e(N ) ∗ e(r2)” with p-value = ”χ2tail(2, e(N ) ∗ e(r2))

1.0188

-1.7323

gres2

(dropped)

score2govd
1.0538

(dropped)

score2so2

-4.5448

(dropped)

score2no2

0.0066

Std. Err.

gres1

-0.0033

(dropped)

score2gdpcapita

score2price

(dropped)

Coef.

score2henvscore

one
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